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The purpose of the essays collected in the book Morality and the Emotions, as noted by 
its editor Carla Bagnoli, is to “reclaim emotions as a subject of investigation for moral 
philosophy” (27). Do emotions have any role in morality? And if they do, what is it? Many 
will be inclined to answer the first question affirmatively, but they will encounter serious 
difficulties in attempting to answer the second question. As soon as one examines the latter 
question in more detail, one realizes that the connection between emotions and morality is 
far more complex and puzzling than it might appear at first sight. There is a sense in which 
this connection is marked by various conflicts and problems that one cannot easily see 
how to resolve. For example, should one worry that placing emotions within the domain 
of morality can result in undermining its authority? Emotions are usually considered to 
be unstable, fleeting and unreliable mental states and it might seem doubtful that as such 
they can provide the firm ground for morality. This also becomes vivid when one considers 
the possibility of reconciling the partial nature of emotions with moral impartiality. And 
there are more specific questions one should try to answer when thinking about the role 
of the emotions in our ethical lives. What is the link between the emotions and moral 
responsibility? What is the role of the emotions in forming one’s moral identity? The book 
Morality and the Emotions addresses all these questions. It consists of three parts, and an 
excellent introduction written by the editor Carla Bagnoli. Bagnoli gives a useful overview 
of the whole field, providing the reader with the solid ground for further research of this 
important topic.
Part I opens up with the paper “Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral Reason”, 
in which Carla Bagnoli deals with the problem of the authority of morality. The authority 
of morality and its binding force is something that requires explanation. According to 
rationalism, the explanation is given by grounding morality in practical reason; morality 
provides reasons for action – reasons that apply to all rational agents. The trouble with this 
approach, it is often pointed out, is that it cannot explain the motivating force of morality. 
This feature of morality is nicely explained by sentimentalism – the view that, roughly 
speaking, grounds morality in emotions. But the sentimentalist approach faces the opposite 
problem. Since emotions represent the true source of motivation, the sentimentalists 
can easily explain the fact that morality moves us to action, but they have difficulites 
in explaining the authority of morality. Bagnoli tries to reconcile the two approaches by 
appealing to the notion of respect. The two views are complementary, she argues, because 
respect is “the emotional attitude that is constitutive of rational agency” (75). 
The attempt to find the middle ground between two seemingly conflicting conceptions 
– Aristotle’s rationalist account and the psychoanalytic approach – is also present in 
Edward Hartcourt’s paper “Self-love and Practical Rationality”. But this time it is not 
respect that is constitutive of rational agency, but the constitutive connection rather exists 
between practical rationality and self-love (93). In “Craving the Right: Emotions and 
Moral Reasons”, Patricia Greenspan tries to find the place for emotions in deontological 




ethics, attributing them a role “that is compatible with both rationality and genuinely moral 
motivation” (41). Since the common feature of all these essays is the attempt to reconcile 
what might be thought to be conflicting philosophical views, it is hardly surprising that 
Part I closes with the topic dealing with the nature of compromises. In his clearly written 
essay “The Nature and Morality of Romantic Compromises”, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev suggests 
that the distinctive feature of compromises is that one sacrifises something that has value 
in order to get greater value in return. But if this “negative aspect” – sacrifising something 
one values – is a constitutive part of compromises, one could wonder whether this might 
affect one’s autonomy in romantic relationships. Unfortunately, Ben-Ze’ev does not deal 
with this question.
There are at least two ways in which one may approach the discussion about the relation 
between emotions and values. It is sometimes argued that emotions are like perceptions: it 
is exactly by means of emotions that we perceive values. In such way, emotions may play 
a very important role for us as moral agents. People who lack the particular emotions may 
not be able to perceive certain situations in moral light. They may not be able, in other 
words, to perceive certain features as morally relevant and that may greatly affect their 
general moral understanding. It is only when we have emotions of love or compassion, for 
example, that we may “see” the suffering and misfortune of others. 
The problem about the relation between emotions and values, however, could be approached 
from another angle as well. Instead of being concerned with the question of whether 
emotions have perceptual role, one may be primarily interested in values themselves, and 
attempt to determine whether they can be analyzed in terms of emotions. The close link 
between values and emotions already emerges when we consider everyday concepts such 
as shameful and disgusting. At least at first glance, it just seems very hard to analyze these 
concepts without appealing to emotions of shame and disgust. In this way, emotions seem 
to provide basis for our evaluative judgements. These and many related issues are covered 
in Part II.
Although it is very hard to deny that certain evaluative concepts can be analyzed in terms 
of emotions, the problem emerges when one realizes that this analysis may take many 
different forms. Christine Tappolet’s paper “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism’s 
Prospects” is concerned exactly with this problem. The core claim of neosentimentalism 
is that evaluative concepts are response-dependent: to say that x is shameful, for example, 
is to say that the emotion of shame is an appropriate response to x. But what does it mean 
to say that the emotional response is appropriate? Tappolet argues that there are two ways 
in which the concept of appropriateness may be understood: it may either mean that the 
emotion is required (that one ought to feel shame as a response to x) or that the emotion 
corresponds to the independent states of affaires (that the emotion of shame is a correct 
response to x). Thus, Tappolet develops two different arguments in order to show that the 
descriptive version of neo-sentimentalism is to be favoured over its normative version.
But is our emotion of shame itself a reason to judge that x is shameful? Those who answer 
this question affirmatively often bring our attention to the similarities between emotions 
and perceptual experiences – just like we often appeal to our perceptual experiences in 
order to justify our empirical beliefs, we often appeal to our emotional experiences in order 
to justify our evaluative beliefs. In his “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons”, Michael S. 
Brady raises doubts about this “perceptual model” of emotions by highlighting the crucial 
differences that exist between emotions and perceptions. It is not my emotion of shame, 
Brady argues, that gives me a reason to judge that x is shameful, but rather the feature of x 
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to which my emotion of shame is a response. 
This is not to say that there is no way in which emotions can provide justification of our 
moral judgements. As Paul Thagard and Tracy Finn argue in their paper “Conscience: 
What is Moral Intuition?” denying the role of emotions in forming moral judgements 
would be equivalent to denying the epistemic role of moral intuitions. This is because 
moral intuitions “are inherently emotional” (163). The evidence for this claim the authors 
find in the neural theory of emotional consciousness according to which “emotions are both 
cognitive appraisals and somatic perceptions, performed simultaneously by interacting 
brain areas” (151). It is exactly because these two components that we may often rely on 
our moral intuitions as good evidence for the appropriateness of our moral judgements. 
In contrast to Thagard and Finn, Blum’s paper “Empathy and Empirical Psychology: A 
Critique of Shaun Nichols’s Neo-Sentimentalism” aims to show that approaching the study 
of emotions from the perspective of experimental philosophy may not always bring the best 
results. Thus Blum points out that empirical psychology does not capture the true nature 
of the emotion of empathy, and suggests that the reason for this failure presumably lies in 
ignoring the long tradition of philosophical moral psychology, which can still significantly 
contribute to our understanding of moral emotions.
And the existence of moral emotions is another reason for thinking that there is a very close 
connection between morality and the emotions. Even though there is no exact classification 
of moral as opposed to non-moral emotions, it is commonly thought that emotions such as 
resentment, guilt, remorse, shame etc. fall into the former category. The question of what 
makes a particular emotion a moral emotion is also not easy to answer, but it would not be 
far from the truth to say that the explanation of their existence involves appealing to one’s 
personal moral outlook or moral system to which one belongs. Most essays included in 
Part III analyze the nature of moral emotions from different perspectives and question the 
extent to which they can contribute to our understanding of various moral issues. 
As P. F. Strawson has famously argued in his “Freedom and Resentment”, attributing 
moral responsibility crucially depends on reactive attitudes such as resentment, guilt and 
indignation. Strawson’s argument is the central theme of John Deigh and Bennett W. Helm’s 
contributions to the volume. While both authors examine Strawson’s proposal in relation 
to the account of reactive attitudes given by R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, they 
reach somewhat different conclusions. John Deigh’s primary aim is to show that Wallace 
and Darwall go wrong in assuming that reactive attitudes involve beliefs about reasons 
and are thus essentially concerned with rational agents. Reactive atttitudes should not be 
understood in terms of human rationality but rather in terms of “human sociability” (213). 
Helm, on the other hand, thinks that there is at least one aspect of Wallace’s suggestion that 
should be preserved – that our reactive attitudes occur as a response to a failure to live up 
to certain expectations and demands. 
Since Wallace starts from the presumption that reactive attitudes are those that occur when 
moral expectations are violated, his list of basic reactive attitudes considerably differs from 
the one proposed by Strawson. Wallace’s understanding of reactive attitudes makes him 
think that only the negative emotions (i.e. anger, guilt) are important for attributing moral 
responsibility. In “Moral Sentiment and the Sources of Moral Identity” Jacqueline Taylor 
argues that this approach should be abandoned because it makes us lose sight of the role 
that the positive emotions play in morality. There is a very good reason why sentimentalists 
of the eighteenth century emphasized their importance: it is because the positive emotions 
“are crucial sources of moral identity and agency” (257). The importance of the emotions in 
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forming one’s moral identity is also the focus of Talbot Brewer’s “On Alienated Emotions”.
Instead of focusing on moral emotions as such, in her paper “Guilty Thoughts”, Angela 
M. Smith focuses particularly on the emotion of guilt. It is rational to feel the emotion of 
guilt if one performed the action she ought not to have performed. But how to account for 
cases when a person feels guilty because of the mere fact that she has certain thoughts 
or emotions? If these thoughts and emotions are not expressed, then why do people feel 
guilty just having them? In dealing with this question, Smith firstly confronts and dismisses 
three objections to the thesis that people should be deemed responsible for their inner 
feelings. After having established that there are cases in which such feelings of guilt could 
be rational, Smith rejects two possible explanations of this phenomenon – the virtue-ethical 
response and the consequentialist response. According to Smith, the solution to the puzzle 
lies in the acceptance of a contractualist moral theory proposed by T. M. Scanlon.
Although the problem of emotions is often discussed in current philosophical literature, 
the question of the role of emotions in morality is still not given the attention it deserves. 
In this regard, this question lingers on the margins of current discussions, even the most 
influential ones in the field of the philosophy of emotions. This is why the book Morality 
and the Emotions is a valuable contribution and a good starting point for professionals 
working in this area.  
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